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The dramatic increase in house prices, such as the US experienced from 1996 until early 2007, 
along with the following price crash, are events in the real estate history that are hard to forget. 
Researchers have been expending considerable effort in trying to understand these events, but 
their understanding is still far from complete. How could the regional phenomenon of a real 
estate bubble in the US have a contagion effect and become a threat to the economic 
development in many other countries? Property price bubbles have repeatedly contributed to 
the emergence of major crises. The bursting of the US real estate bubble in 2008, for example, 
has contributed to the global financial crisis, of which the global economy has still not fully 
recovered from. During the course of the crisis, it became clear which key role residential real 
estate plays for the growth of an economy and how far-reaching consequences can be given 
speculative price exaggerations.1 This is one of the reasons why developments in residential 
property markets are increasingly being brought to the forefront of the public and questioned 
critically. Consequently, an early detection of imbalances should gain importance in the future 
in order to avoid another global financial market crisis. 
Real estate markets are closely linked to the financial markets through the protection of loans. 
In the ‘80s and ‘90s, liberalization of the financial and mortgage markets facilitated access to 
mortgage lending. This stimulated demand and contributed to more liquid real estate markets, 
and was, therefore, an important factor in real estate price development. However, there exist 
some differences among countries. For instance, in contrast to the US which loosened its 
lending requirements prior to the US subprime crisis, Germany retained stricter requirements 
for real estate financing and was characterized by a relatively stable real estate market. Whereas 
house prices did not increase tremendously prior to the crisis in Germany and no bubble formed, 
in Spain and Anglo-Saxon countries the enormous increases finally led to the bursting of the 
                                                
1 Demary (2008), p. 1 
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bubbles. This indicates that property prices developments across countries are not equal and 
that business cycle divergence might exist.  
Since it is also possible that the financial markets are the source of the unhealthy developments 
in the real estate markets, both markets must be considered together for a complete analysis. 
Nevertheless, even though recent history has shown that the development of a financial market 
crisis can be the cause of some weaknesses in the real estate market, this pattern cannot be 
explained by the general law. For example, during the Japan housing crisis in the early 1990s, 
there was no financial market crisis in Singapore and Hong Kong, as opposed to in Malaysia 
and Thailand, which was to a large extent due to higher liquidity reserves and equity ratios.2  
Recently, several countries, especially in Northern and Western Europe, have been 
experiencing enormous price increases in the real estate market. Prices in London, for example, 
are roughly 15% higher than before the crisis.3 In Germany, prices for residential properties 
have risen significantly in the metropolitan cities and areas in recent years. According to the 
Deutsche Bank, house prices doubled since 2009.4 Real estate prices in Scandinavia have, since 
2011, risen with strong rates of around five percent a year. Property prices in Sweden have 
doubled for homes in particularly sought-after locations, and prices of certain condos even 
tripled within ten years.5 Besides in Northern and Western European countries, property prices 
in Canada have grown incredibly high. It is not surprising that with an increase of 50% in real 
housing prices over only five years, Toronto occupies the first place of the UBS Global Real 
Estate Bubble Index.6 The risk of a bubble has considerably augmented in several major cities, 
according to UBS – and compared to inflation and economic growth, these increases are 
disproportionate. In view of these recent developments, memories of the tumultuous American 
real estate market are growing rapidly and many experts fear that another housing bubble is 
                                                
2 Hilbers et al. (2001), p. 15ff 
3 UBS Global Real Estate Bubble Index 
4 Sackmann C. (2017) 
5 Siedenbiedel C. (2015) 
6 UBS Global Real Estate Bubble Index 
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approaching with risk of another explosion. Against this background, the following question 
arises: Are the current price developments still reasonable or is a price bubble forming on 
numerous residential property markets? In order to come up with an answer to this question, 
first of all, it is necessary to understand which factors drive real estate prices. Only then one 
will be able to better understand which factors are responsible for price increases and for the 
emergence of price bubbles on real estate markets. Accordingly, the aim of this work is to 
identify potential determinants of property prices and to investigate current dynamics on certain 
property markets. 
For this purpose, the remainder of this work is structured as follows: the subsequent section 
provides an overview of existing literature regarding housing bubble definitions and the 
detection of housing bubbles. The third section includes a description of the dataset. The fourth 
section analyzes the main macroeconomic and real estate market determinants of house price 
bubbles in 15 OECD countries. This section follows a description of the econometric model 
performed to detect explosive property price behaviors and its results. Finally, the last section 
finishes with a conclusion and a discussion of the limitations of this study.  
2 Definition and Literature Review 
For the further course of the work, it is essential to know what is generally understood as a 
"price bubble". Even under economists, the term "price bubble" is not clearly defined, and 
opinions about it are widely divergent. In order to understand property price movements, it is 
essential to understand the determinants of house prices. Price increases in real estate can have 
different causes. On the one hand, these reflect the development of fundamental factors. On the 
other hand, a property price increase can also be caused by non-fundamental factors such as 
speculation. Besides, in order to be able to adequately answer the question of the existence of 
a bubble on residential property markets in some European countries and North America, it is 
indispensable to clarify the conditions under which a price bubble can be assumed. The fact 
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that this is by no means trivial is shown by popular examples of price bubbles in different 
markets from the recent past, notably the dot-com bubble in 2000 and the subprime crisis in 
2007. In spite of exorbitant price exaggerations, bubbles were not recognized as such and only 
fully identified after their bursting.7 Basically, one must keep in mind that the triggering factors 
for a bubble can be quite different in each case, and as some well-known experts say: “The fact 
that a bubble is a bubble is only known when it bursts.” Prior to the burst, a bubble can almost 
never be identified without uncertainty.8 This is why it is difficult to make a reliable statement 
beforehand about whether price increases are still realistic or reasonable or if an overvaluation 
already exists. There is no criterion or indicator for determining the point from which a 
"normal" property price revaluation changes into a bubble formation. Against this background, 
it is also not surprising that there is still no uniform opinion on a scientifically based definition 
of the price bubble phenomenon. Yet, a housing bubble is often defined as the deviation of the 
current real estate price far above its long-term ‘fundamental value’. The fundamental value of 
any asset is the present value of all future cash flows implying that the price of a property 
depends on its anticipated future rents.9 The market price, on the other hand, is determined daily 
by the combination of supply and demand.10 
The Nobel Prize Recipient in Economic Sciences, Joseph Stiglitz, offers one of the most 
popular definitions of a price bubble. According to him, a price bubble is always present when 
the reason for high prices is based solely on the beliefs of the investors that higher resale prices 
can be achieved in the future. "If the reason is the price is high today, it is only because investors 
believe that the selling price will be high tomorrow – when ‘fundamental’ factors do not seem 
to justify such a price - then a bubble exists ".11 Stiglitz interprets vast price declines, which 
occur without any apparent new information, as the breaking of the bubble. This explanation 
                                                
7 Hens T. and Bachmann K. (2008), p. 94 
8 Morita K. (2017), p. 119 
9 Wang (2000), p. 186 
10 Rombach (2011), p. 41f 
11 Stiglitz (1990), p. 13 
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is, therefore, based on the excessive expectations of future prices, which lead to an excessive 
increase in demand and, in turn, to an increase in the volume of transactions.12 Stiglitz's 
behavior-based perception, however, does not provide reliable information about the existence 
of an overheating of the real estate market. A distinctive definition of the term 'bubble” must, 
therefore, be able to distinguish a property bubble from a purely cyclical development. In view 
of this, economics usually speak of a bubble only when the market price of an asset deviates 
long-term and significantly from its fundamentally justified value. As market participants 
realize that their expectations are too optimistic, there is a regular sales wave that ultimately 
leads to a sharp correction in prices and to an adjustment of the fundamentally justified level, 
resulting in the burst of the bubble. Case and Shiller (2003) argue that households’ anticipation 
of enormous price increases might have a great effect on demand, particularly when they 
believe that purchasing a property is associated with little risk. Nevertheless, they note that the 
simple occurrence of prompt price developments is not by definition a decisive indication of a 
bubble - as these increases might, to a great extent, be explained by economic fundamentals. 
Likewise, McCarthy and Peach (2004) claim that the growth in homes prices in the years before 
the burst in 2007 was essentially attributable to strong fundamentals - especially to low interest 
rates and high incomes. Himmelberg et al. (2005) also emphasize the role of economic 
fundamentals, such as the user cost of housing, to justify the latest house price movements. 
They argue that commonly used measures like price-to-rent or price-to-income ratios are 
misleading in revealing housing price bubbles. Analysts utilizing such conventional metrics 
might find evidence for overvaluation when, in fact, properties are rationally priced.  
Another explanatory approach is dedicated to the behavior of market participants. Accordingly, 
individuals are driven by their expectations that prices may continue to rise. Speculators will 
enter the market in order to sell the properties soon after they purchased them for a higher price. 
This inspires other participants’ expectations to rise, causing them to invest as well (herd 
                                                
12 Irle M. (2010), p. 12 
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behavior). This does not only mean that the transactions of an industry are rising sharply, but 
that this is also accompanied by a significant increase in prices. The optimistic speculative 
motive drives individuals to behave irrationally in the marketplace, suggesting that fundamental 
and objective factors are not considered in the decision when buying.13 Thus, when the summit 
is reached, a sharp fall in residential prices driven by panic sales occurs.14 In this context, Alan 
Greenspan's term "irrational exuberance" became very popular in 1996 and forms the basis of 
a speculative price bubble.15 Nonetheless, a bubble can also emerge by reason of rational 
expectations. Investors are accepting exaggerated market prices, assuming they will profit from 
further price increases in the future. However, this presupposes that they resell before the 
bubble bursts.  
Mian and Sufi (2009) studied if expectations could stimulate the faster expansion of subprime 
lending by comparing house-price growth in subprime as well as non-subprime areas. They 
could not find evidence and thus concluded that the growth of mortgage credit was caused by 
supply factors such as the increase in subprime mortgage securitization and the easing of 
underwriting principles. Further exploring the expectations hypothesis of Mian and Sufi (2009), 
Brueckner, Calem and Nakamura (2011) found evidence that a positive alteration in future 
house-price outlooks, generated by fast previous appreciation, does lead to an extension of 
mortgage borrowers with lower credit ratings. Although the fundamental point of view is 
dominant, difficulties can sometimes arise in the determination of the fundamental value of 
assets. On the one hand, this is derived from a large number of economic variables, which are 
not always directly measurable or observable. At the same time, a price bubble, in reality, is 
often difficult to distinguish between cyclical fluctuations and structural breaks. In spite of these 
obvious criticisms, the term price bubble is used in the further course of this work whenever 
the market price differs from its fundamentally justified value. In light of the lack of general 
                                                
13 Rombach (2011), p. 65-66 
14 Kindleberger, C. (2011), p. 84 
15 Shiller, R. (2015), p.2; Shiller (2000), p. 60-62 
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agreement regarding the definition of a housing bubble, it is not astonishing that the empirical 
approaches of how to measure or detect housing price bubbles differ. 
2.1 Literature Review - Detection of Price Bubbles 
Nneiji et al. (2011) explore whether intrinsic bubbles and rational speculative bubbles caused 
deviations from fundamental values in the US housing market over 1960-2009 using a regime 
switching approach. Due to fundamental price-rent ratio changes, they split the data into two 
sub-periods and find an intrinsic bubble in the first sub-period (until 1999), suggesting that 
purchasers overreact to changes in renting costs. However, from 2000 onwards, their results 
show evidence of a rational speculative bubble. Agnello and Schuknecht (2011) use a Random 
Effects panel probit model for 18 industrialized European economies over 1980-2007 in order 
to identify real estate boom and bust periods. Among other things, they found out that this 
model is able to identify these periods early on and that several policy variables such as interest 
rates strongly influence the probability of booms and busts. 
Cointegration analysis is often used to detect house price bubbles as it can give an indication 
of whether two variables move in the same magnitude. Gallin (2003) performed both standard 
cointegration tests at the national level and panel-data cointegration tests at the local level to 
examine the long-run relationship between property prices and income. For the purpose of the 
standard tests, he used national data over 27 years and for the panel-data tests he used data of 
95 metropolitan areas over a period of 23 years. His results do not support cointegration 
between prices and fundamentals in either of the methods. From this, he concludes that prices 
are not related to fundamentals and, thus, error-correction models may be incorrect. Jian Zhou 
(2010) also analyzes the cointegration relationship between property prices and fundamental 
indicators. Besides linear cointegration, he tests for nonlinear cointegration for ten American 
cities. Linear cointegration was only found in one city, whereas six other cities showed 
nonlinear cointegration applying a two-step approach.  
Brunnermeier and Julliard (2007) state that money illusion is the reason for the connection 
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between inflation and real estate market mispricing because people do not account for inflation 
when comparing rents and mortgage payments. Money illusion is defined by the incorrect 
assumption that real and nominal interest rates move in lockstep. They separate price-to-rent 
ratio movements into two parts: a rational as well as a mispricing part. Their findings show that, 
in the US and the UK, a great portion of the mispricing component can be explained by inflation 
and nominal interest rates.  
3 Data  
The empirical part of this paper deals with the determinants of property prices and with the 
analysis about whether a bubble is currently forming in 15 advanced OECD economies. Section 
3.1 presents potential housing price determinants. Section 3.2 outlines how the hypothesis was 
constructed. In section 3.2, the sources and the timespan of the data will be described. 
3.1 House Price Determinants 
As every asset, house price dynamics are driven by several demand and supply factors. 
Therefore, econometric models of the determinants of supply and demand for real estate, as 
well as affordability indicators, are used to identify price bubbles. Demand for property and, 
subsequently, real estate prices are essentially determined by disposable income, mortgage 
rates, the legal environment and, in the long run, by demographic trends. Supply is among 
others determined by the availability of land, construction costs, and the profitability of the 
property. Housing supply is relatively inelastic because it takes time to react to demand and to 
construct a new property. Therefore, in the short term, a discrepancy between supply and 
demand is likely to exist – even though in the long-run demand and supply are presumed to be 
in equilibrium. Consequently, supply is rather fixed in the short run but can adjust in the long 
term.  
According to the fundamental-based explanatory approach for house price bubbles, 
housing demand and supply are most commonly affected by fundamental determinants: 
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economic, financial and demographic determinants. Thus, the effect of GDP per capita, 
inflation, long-term interest rates (mortgage rates), construction costs, current account balances, 
unemployment, population growth, building permits, tax on property and domestic credit to the 
private sector on residential housing prices was evaluated.  
3.2 Hypothesis Development 
To do so, an equation which captures the influence of these variables on property prices was 
determined: 
!""#$% = '( + ß+ ∗ -.""/$% + + 01 ∗ /"#$% + + 02 ∗ 34!$% − + 06 ∗ "7"$% + + 08 ∗ 9:$% − + 0; ∗ 	/=$% − + 0>
∗ ?"$% + + 0@ ∗ /7:A4$% + + 0B ∗ /!C.#4$% + + 0B ∗ 4=D$% − + E$% 
where RPPI stands for the Residential Property Price Index, GDPPC for gross domestic product 
per capita, LTR for the long-term bond yield, POP for the population growth, UN for the 
unemployment rate, CA for the current account balance, BP for building permits, CONST for 
the construction cost index, CREDIT for the domestic credit to private sector, TAX stands for 
the tax rate on property and E$% represents the error term. 
The signs in brackets behind each endogenous variable in the above-stated equation specify 
how housing demand and, hence, prices are influenced by these variables. A plus sign means 
that an increase in the explanatory variable is expected to lead to a growth in property prices 
and vice versa. In the following, the influence of each determinant on house prices will be 
explained in more detail. 
GDP growth, disposable income, and unemployment rates are considered important indicators 
of wealth measurement and economic growth of a country. In our study, GDP per capita is used 
as a proxy for disposable income. Disposable income mainly determines the payments a 
household is able to make, thus, defining the affordability of housing. Households with higher 
income are wealthier and more likely to receive a mortgage because their probability of default 
is lower. An increase in the population’s average income implies an increase in demand and 
consequently in prices. On the other hand, house prices also affect income since a property 
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price appreciation signifies a capital accumulation for households. This, in turn, can increase 
consumption beyond that related to current income.16 
Given the amount a household can afford, if inflation is high and interest rates are low, this 
household will accept a higher property price. Deflation, on the contrary, has devastating 
consequences for homebuyers: the property value and the rental income of indexed leases 
decline. For the same reason, labor income and, thus, the ability to pay off debts decline. On 
the other hand, the real value of liability increases dramatically because the mortgage payments 
stay the same.17 Financial advisor Max Herbst claims that housing prices often react earlier to 
changes in inflation because the risk is often prematurely included in the interest rate.18 It is 
widely known that, in times of inflation, houses and apartments are often bought as a protection. 
Correspondingly, housing demand and prices will increase when inflation increases.  
In order to account for demographic influences, unemployment and population growth were 
considered in the analysis. Unemployment drives housing demand and negatively affects house 
price dynamics. A higher unemployment rate reduces the number of potential homeowners as 
some people might no longer be able to afford a mortgage. This implies a decline in both 
housing demand and prices. Besides, higher unemployment implies that, in the long-run, 
homeowners might not be able to repay their mortgages and, thus, have to sell their properties, 
leading to a higher supply of housing. Furthermore, the unemployment rate is an indicator of 
economic growth of an economy. If economic development is expected to worsen, lenders will 
tighten their credit standards so that some people might no longer be able to receive credit. As 
result, tightened borrowing conditions reduce demand for housing and contribute to property 
price decreases. In many countries, lower unemployment rates combined with a steady growth 
in disposable income over the last years, have driven up housing demand.  
In contrast to unemployment, population growth impacts housing demand positively. 
                                                
16 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996)  




Population growth implies that the number of households increases and that the greater need 
for housing exerts pressure on housing prices.  
Current account balances measure a country’s foreign trade and are used as an indicator for 
foreign capital inflows. Greater current account balances reveal a drop of net capital inflows 
and should, therefore, reduce the pressure on housing prices. The more negative the current 
account balance, the higher are capital inflows.  
In addition to these macroeconomic variables, real estate market factors are expected to affect 
housing prices. Hence, taxation on property, building permits, construction costs, and mortgage 
rates are included as explanatory variables in the model. The mortgage rate is a crucial real 
estate related factor that is influencing property prices. Mortgage rates determine the price of 
credit. Especially since most households finance their homes via mortgages, the interest rate on 
the loans will influence their decision as to whether they should lend or buy a property. We will 
use long-term bond yields to approximate mortgage interest rates of each country. If interest 
rates decrease, the cost of borrowing becomes less expensive, meaning that the affordability of 
credit goes up. Easier access to financing will increase housing demand and property prices. 
The theoretical inverse relationship between house prices and interest rates underlines this 
association. Another potential property price determinant is money supply. However, the close 
relation to inflation and interest rates makes it unnecessary to include this variable.  
Construction costs and building permits capture the activity in the housing market. Both have 
a positive impact on the evolution of house prices. Construction costs consist of expenses for 
material and labor and are one of the main cost elements of a new house. Subsequently, higher 
construction costs undoubtedly result in higher house prices, reducing the affordability of 
housing. On the other hand, if construction costs decline, construction activity will expand, 
increasing the supply of housing. Although this will induce falling house prices in the short run, 
prices will go up in the long run due to an increase in demand. However, not only construction 
costs influence housing prices, but housing prices could also affect construction costs. This can 
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be explained by the fact that higher property prices encourage suppliers and construction 
workers to request higher prices and wages. This might not necessarily be revealed in house 
prices immediately or in the short-run, but maybe in the long-run.19 Another indicator that is 
supposed to affect house prices is a country’s taxation on property which is measured as a 
percentage of GDP. Including this indicator allows capturing the influence of fiscal policy. An 
increase in property taxes could change individuals’ preferences and behaviors in such a way 
that demand for housing is reduced. “Favorable depreciation rules will increase the after-tax 
yield generated by real estate. This will increase the demand to hold real estate assets” 
(DiPasquale & Wheaton, 1992, p. 192).  
As an indicator for mortgage lending standards or the level of development and regulation of 
the financial sector, domestic credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP was included as 
an explanatory variable. There exists a positive relation between domestic credit to private 
sector and house prices. In times when economic outlook remains stable or in times of better 
growth prospects, lenders expect lower default rates due to improved borrower 
creditworthiness, leading them to grant more credit and/or to relax credit conditions. This 
results in a higher volume of credit as well as in price appreciations. However, the relationship 
can also be interpreted the other way around: higher property prices stimulate future house price 
expectations and thereby drive up demand for credit. Moreover, increases in property prices 
lead to growing property values and, accordingly, to greater collateral values homeowners can 
offer to banks. This, in turn, leads to banks granting credit more easily, which could accelerate 
the formation of a housing bubble. In the next part, the data sources and data transformation of 
the above-described variables are explained. 
3.3 Dataset  
The dataset covers fifteen advanced economies in Europe, namely Germany, France, Italy, 
Spain, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway and 
                                                
19 Chen, M. and Patel, K. (1998) 
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Finland, as well as the Anglo-Saxon economies, the US and the UK, and Canada. Residential 
Property Price Indices (RPPIs) were downloaded from Thomson Reuters DataStream from 
1970 to 2017, on a quarterly basis. This corresponds to 190 data points per time series, at best. 
The time series for Germany and the Nordics start in the first quarter of 1973. With only 118 
observations (starting in q1 of 1988), the Portuguese property price series is the shortest. Even 
though the RPPIs are based on quarterly OECD data, a yearly frequency was chosen since the 
availability of the right-hand side variables in quarterly frequency is limited. Although OECD 
can be considered a reliable source, residential property data is not easily available on a 
comparable basis, despite their importance in macroeconomic and financial stability analysis. 
This is due to the fact that the indices are based on national sources and are thus calculated 
differently.20 According to this, it is very important to consider that these time series are not 
directly comparable between countries. This should be taken into account when interpreting the 
data. However, this drawback is irrelevant to the following study, as we do not intend to 
compare countries, but investigate potential transmission channels between price determinants 
and property prices. The majority of the independent variables were also extracted from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream. Taxes on property were extracted from the OECD website, 
credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP were extracted from the World Bank website 
and the long-term bond yields were extracted from Bloomberg. Unfortunately, due to limited 
data availability, not all explanatory variables could be extracted for the same timespan as the 
RPPIs. As the information is going to be pooled in a panel, because we are concerned with the 
evolution of comparable time series from numerous countries, this is not a serious problem. 
Besides, we apply the model specification in the log first differences (growth rates) of the 
variables. One of the advantages associated with year-over-year changes is that they 
                                                
20 House price indices correspond generally to seasonally unadjusted series constructed from national data from a variety of 
public and/or private sources (for example, national statistical services, mortgage lenders and real estate agents). National house 




automatically neutralize seasonality. Natural-logarithmation enables to interpret the impulse 
responses as percentage deviations from the long-term equilibrium value. Only unemployment 
rates and tax on property were not transformed into growth rates. For an overview of the 
variables please see Table 6.  
4 Panel Data Models - Fixed Effects Model  
Panel data modeling is a method to estimate data which is both time-series and cross-sectional 
and which accounts for individual specific heterogeneity. One speaks of a balanced panel if 
each individual, in our analysis each country, is observed in every period. On the other hand, if 
some data points are missing in the time series, one speaks of an unbalanced panel. Our sample 
panel data is unbalanced as each country is not observed in all time periods. The Random 
Effects model and the Fixed Effects model are the two elementary panel data models. They 
differ with regard to the individual-specific effects. In the Random Effects model, this effect is 
a random variable which is uncorrelated with the independent variables whereas it is correlated 
in the Fixed Effects model.21 To determine which model is the most consistent, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test can be applied. Under the null, there is no correlation between the independent 
variable and the error term and the appropriate model is the Random Effects model, whereas 
under the alternative, this correlation is statistically significant and the Fixed Effects model is 
appropriate.22 If the unobservable factors are time-invariant, then a Fixed Effects regression 
will eliminate omitted variable bias. Before performing the aforementioned regression models 
with Stata, the data was organized as panel data in the long form in excel. Then, the correlation 
between the explanatory variables was analyzed (see Table 1). As no correlation between the 
variables could be discovered (none of them had a value over 0.80), all of them were kept in 
the regression model. In the next step, the Random Effects model and the Fixed Effects model 
were performed, followed by the Hausman Test. Unfortunately, the model fitted on these data 
                                                
21 Schmidheiny K. (2016) 
22 Karlsson S. (2014), p. 11	
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failed to meet the asymptotic of the Hausman test, resulting in no outcome about whether the 
Random or the Fixed Effects model would better fit the data. In panel data models with fixed 
effects, the estimate is based on the unobserved individual-specific influencing factors. This 
increases the number of parameters to be estimated according to the number of individuals. The 
precedent condition for this regression being that you have a time series and, at the same time, 
within each cross-section time variation. As the name implies, this model controls for the 
average differences across the countries, it fixes the average effects of each country in any 
unobservable or observable predictors. Each of the variables contained in the equation is 
subtracted from the respective individual-specific mean values. The within-transformation thus 
eliminates the individual effects, since they are time-invariant. The transformed equation can 
then be estimated using OLS. In the basic Fixed Effects model, the effect of each predictor 
variable (i.e., the slope) is assumed to be identical across all the groups, and the regression 
merely reports the average within-group effect. Thus, the across-group action is being 
eliminated whereas the within-group action is kept. As result, the problem of omitted variable 
bias can be significantly reduced.23 The advantage of this approach is that the unobserved 
individual effects may be correlated with the influencing factor contained in the model. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Random Effects model, the Fixed Effects model allows for 
endogeneity.24 This seems to be more realistic in our model because the direction of causality 
is very dubious for some explanatory variables. Accordingly, house prices affect some of the 
independent variables as well – and not just the other way around as it would be the case for 
the random effects model. For instance, as already explained in section 3, higher housing prices 
can lead to higher construction costs. On the basis of these facts, the Fixed Effects model is 
preferred over the Random Effects model in the analysis of house price determinants.  
In Stata, we first loaded the panel data using the command xtsset. Subsequently, three Fixed 
                                                
23 Dranove D. (2012), p. 9 
24	Dranove D. (2012), p. 2	
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Effects regressions were performed which vary in the way the explanatory variables were 
included. We regressed the explanatory variables on the RPPIs of the same period, then on the 
lags, and finally on both using the command xtreg with the option of robust standard errors and 
year dummies. Robust standard errors were added in order to handle the problem of 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic errors. Serial correlation of 
idiosyncratic errors is common when the number of time periods exceeds two.25 In case serial 
correlation is present in the Fixed Effects model, the standard errors are severely understated.26 
Moreover, it is likely that all countries are, in the same way, affected by time-specific effects. 
Therefore, in order to account for aggregate trends, the dummies for each year were included. 
The first regression which included the contemporaneous changes of the explanatory variables 
relies on the assumption that house prices react immediately to shocks - based on the fact that 
asset prices should react immediately to new arriving information. However, there are some 
reasons why lags of the right-hand side variables could better explain the evolution of property 
prices. First, house prices are most likely delayed in responding to changes in the 
macroeconomic environment. Second, in terms of the aforementioned direction of causality, 
some endogenous variables might follow house price increases. In addition, previous year’s 
house prices most likely affect the expectations of market participants regarding future prices, 
which can influence demand and housing prices. This is why, in the second regression, all 
explanatory variables enter the equation with their preceding values. In the third step, a mixture 
of the first and the second estimation was chosen: the right-hand variables entered both in 
contemporaneous changes and in changes lagged once. 
                                                
25 Schmidheiny K. (2016), p. 9  






4.1 Estimation Results of the Fixed Effects Model 
Table 3: Results Fixed Effects - Regression 1(contemporary specification) 
                                                                               
         rho    .21522116   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03835746
     sigma_u    .02008717
                                                                              
       _cons     .0130231   .0400336     0.33   0.750    -.0734643    .0995105
              
       2015      .0363553   .0289441     1.26   0.231    -.0261745    .0988851
       2014      .0608949   .0307421     1.98   0.069    -.0055193    .1273091
       2013      .0495775   .0184903     2.68   0.019     .0096317    .0895233
       2012      .0447304   .0183918     2.43   0.030     .0049973    .0844634
       2011     -.0029778   .0209805    -0.14   0.889    -.0483033    .0423478
       2010      .0156487   .0184752     0.85   0.412    -.0242646     .055562
       2009      .0828499   .0194101     4.27   0.001     .0409169    .1247829
       2008     -.0189857   .0170304    -1.11   0.285    -.0557777    .0178063
       2007       .046581   .0223187     2.09   0.057    -.0016356    .0947976
       2006      .0498411   .0185694     2.68   0.019     .0097243     .089958
       2005       .065506    .027933     2.35   0.036     .0051604    .1258516
       2004      .0553986    .024258     2.28   0.040     .0029923    .1078049
       2003      .0510907   .0195391     2.61   0.021      .008879    .0933025
       2002       .065469   .0220569     2.97   0.011      .017818      .11312
       2001      .0248893   .0244565     1.02   0.327    -.0279459    .0777244
       2000      .0597104   .0304083     1.96   0.071    -.0059827    .1254036
       1999      .0464174   .0218183     2.13   0.053    -.0007182     .093553
       1998      .0572532   .0338625     1.69   0.115    -.0159022    .1304086
       1997      .0384977   .0322201     1.19   0.253    -.0311095    .1081048
       1996      .0260703   .0195511     1.33   0.205    -.0161672    .0683078
       1995      .0336897   .0229974     1.46   0.167    -.0159931    .0833725
       1994      .0705606   .0247602     2.85   0.014     .0170694    .1240518
       1993      .0553076   .0182824     3.03   0.010     .0158109    .0948042
       1992      .1057414   .0197402     5.36   0.000     .0630954    .1483874
       1991       .126137   .0252913     4.99   0.000     .0714985    .1807755
        YEAR  
              
      ln_TAX    -1.282861   2.031527    -0.63   0.539    -5.671707    3.105985
   ln_Credit     .0000984   .0165493     0.01   0.995    -.0356542    .0358511
       ln_BP     .1614272   .0286315     5.64   0.000     .0995726    .2232817
       ln_CA     .0944614   .1434047     0.66   0.522    -.2153456    .4042684
    ln_UNEMP    -.3803043   .2143791    -1.77   0.099    -.8434423    .0828337
    ln_CONST     .9157733   .2340173     3.91   0.002     .4102096    1.421337
      ln_POP     .5504842   1.177061     0.47   0.648    -1.992401     3.09337
      ln_CPI     .1695346   .5716349     0.30   0.771    -1.065408    1.404477
      ln_LTR     .0061682   .0129292     0.48   0.641    -.0217637    .0341001
    ln_GDPPC     .0766672    .189733     0.40   0.693     -.333226    .4865603
                                                                              
     ln_RPPI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.2613                        Prob > F           =         .
                                                F(13,13)           =         .
       overall = 0.6309                                        max =        19
       between = 0.6119                                        avg =      15.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.6639                         Obs per group: min =        11
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        14
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       211
. xtreg ln_RPPI ln_GDPPC ln_LTR ln_CPI ln_POP ln_CONST ln_UNEMP ln_CA ln_BP ln_Credit ln_TAX i.YEAR, fe vce(robust)
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Table 4: Results Fixed Effects –Regression 2 (only lags) 
                                                                               
         rho    .44065254   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .04108312
     sigma_u    .03646454
                                                                              
       _cons     .1147588   .0481078     2.39   0.033     .0108282    .2186893
              
       2016     -.0303375   .0214211    -1.42   0.180    -.0766149    .0159399
       2015     -.0630803   .0123711    -5.10   0.000    -.0898065    -.036354
       2014     -.0056481   .0151506    -0.37   0.715    -.0383789    .0270827
       2013     -.0612839    .007409    -8.27   0.000      -.07729   -.0452778
       2012      -.107338   .0142848    -7.51   0.000    -.1381983   -.0764776
       2011     -.1041173   .0249719    -4.17   0.001    -.1580657   -.0501689
       2010     -.0074872   .0124329    -0.60   0.557    -.0343468    .0193724
       2009     -.0768814   .0184292    -4.17   0.001    -.1166952   -.0370675
       2008     -.1306213   .0213539    -6.12   0.000    -.1767535    -.084489
       2007     -.0560091   .0163699    -3.42   0.005    -.0913742   -.0206441
       2006     -.0233107    .021015    -1.11   0.287    -.0687108    .0220894
       2005     -.0308171   .0254849    -1.21   0.248    -.0858738    .0242396
       2004     -.0161835   .0207175    -0.78   0.449     -.060941     .028574
       2003     -.0491384    .015559    -3.16   0.008    -.0827517   -.0155252
       2002     -.0239515   .0219598    -1.09   0.295    -.0713928    .0234897
       2001     -.0621658   .0183219    -3.39   0.005    -.1017478   -.0225837
       2000     -.0294328   .0249376    -1.18   0.259    -.0833072    .0244417
       1999     -.0171143   .0160817    -1.06   0.307    -.0518567    .0176281
       1998     -.0702318   .0229242    -3.06   0.009    -.1197566    -.020707
       1997     -.0755389   .0341893    -2.21   0.046    -.1494005   -.0016774
       1996     -.0662145   .0229362    -2.89   0.013    -.1157652   -.0166638
       1995     -.0733472   .0245411    -2.99   0.010    -.1263649   -.0203294
       1994     -.0201751   .0174579    -1.16   0.269    -.0578906    .0175405
       1993     -.0342337   .0169632    -2.02   0.065    -.0708804     .002413
       1992      .0390316   .0274809     1.42   0.179    -.0203373    .0984006
        YEAR  
              
         L1.    -2.714522   1.783656    -1.52   0.152    -6.567877    1.138833
      ln_TAX  
              
         L1.     -.009972   .0237874    -0.42   0.682    -.0613615    .0414175
   ln_Credit  
              
         L1.     .0797259   .0236571     3.37   0.005     .0286178     .130834
       ln_BP  
              
         L1.     .2504219   .1675338     1.49   0.159    -.1115129    .6123567
       ln_CA  
              
         L1.    -.1385451   .2672731    -0.52   0.613    -.7159535    .4388633
    ln_UNEMP  
              
         L1.     .8805174   .2636032     3.34   0.005     .3110373    1.449998
    ln_CONST  
              
         L1.    -1.076389   1.116073    -0.96   0.352    -3.487518    1.334741
      ln_POP  
              
         L1.     .5204956   .5136262     1.01   0.329    -.5891263    1.630118
      ln_CPI  
              
         L1.    -.0491058   .0144504    -3.40   0.005     -.080324   -.0178877
      ln_LTR  
              
         L1.     .0994669   .1981841     0.50   0.624    -.3286838    .5276177
    ln_GDPPC  
                                                                              
     ln_RPPI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5106                        Prob > F           =         .
                                                F(13,13)           =         .
       overall = 0.4044                                        max =        19
       between = 0.2193                                        avg =      15.1
R-sq:  within  = 0.5938                         Obs per group: min =        11
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        14
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       211
>  fe vce(robust)
. xtreg ln_RPPI L.ln_GDPPC L.ln_LTR L.ln_CPI L.ln_POP L.ln_CONST L.ln_UNEMP L.ln_CA L.ln_BP L.ln_Credit L.ln_TAX i.YEAR,
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Table 5: Results Fixed Effects – Regression 3 (contemporary specification and lags) 
                                                                               
         rho    .57074054   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .03400572
     sigma_u    .03921132
                                                                              
       _cons      .061137   .0628441     0.97   0.348    -.0746293    .1969034
              
       2015     -.0167169   .0763806    -0.22   0.830    -.1817272    .1482934
       2014      .0564114   .0719637     0.78   0.447    -.0990566    .2118795
       2013      .0230111   .0709011     0.32   0.751    -.1301615    .1761837
       2012      .0020756   .0767421     0.03   0.979    -.1637156    .1678667
       2011      -.031547   .0717973    -0.44   0.668    -.1866556    .1235617
       2010      .0382774   .0632987     0.60   0.556    -.0984711    .1750259
       2009      .0582195   .0803716     0.72   0.482    -.1154127    .2318517
       2008     -.0416506   .0701682    -0.59   0.563    -.1932398    .1099387
       2007      .0272814    .074868     0.36   0.721    -.1344612     .189024
       2006      .0301675   .0802002     0.38   0.713    -.1430946    .2034295
       2005      .0460703   .0903352     0.51   0.619    -.1490871    .2412276
       2004      .0525762   .0801363     0.66   0.523    -.1205478    .2257002
       2003      .0319561   .0766389     0.42   0.684    -.1336121    .1975243
       2002      .0658796   .0635805     1.04   0.319    -.0714776    .2032369
       2001      .0022196   .0813555     0.03   0.979    -.1735383    .1779775
       2000      .0464483   .0733929     0.63   0.538    -.1121074    .2050041
       1999      .0441423   .0695663     0.63   0.537    -.1061464    .1944311
       1998      .0241569   .0807367     0.30   0.770    -.1502642     .198578
       1997     -.0098505   .0724252    -0.14   0.894    -.1663155    .1466145
       1996      .0050978    .073207     0.07   0.946    -.1530562    .1632518
       1995      .0519641   .0690932     0.75   0.465    -.0973026    .2012308
       1994      .0551385   .0689681     0.80   0.438     -.093858     .204135
       1993      .0532433   .0680977     0.78   0.448    -.0938728    .2003594
       1992      .2564616   .1122045     2.29   0.040     .0140585    .4988648
        YEAR  
              
         L1.    -3.369726   1.366886    -2.47   0.028    -6.322704   -.4167484
      ln_TAX  
              
         L1.    -.0161461   .0171439    -0.94   0.363    -.0531833    .0208911
   ln_Credit  
              
         L1.     .0347053   .0266955     1.30   0.216    -.0229668    .0923775
       ln_BP  
              
         L1.     .1595727   .1093384     1.46   0.168    -.0766384    .3957839
       ln_CA  
              
         L1.     1.303705   .6139768     2.12   0.053    -.0227115    2.630121
    ln_UNEMP  
              
         L1.     .4567609    .279864     1.63   0.127    -.1478486     1.06137
    ln_CONST  
              
         L1.    -.3274621   .9572856    -0.34   0.738    -2.395552    1.740628
      ln_POP  
              
         L1.      .041589   .5083321     0.08   0.936    -1.056596    1.139774
      ln_CPI  
              
         L1.    -.0539598    .014065    -3.84   0.002    -.0843453   -.0235743
      ln_LTR  
              
         L1.     .0696876   .2179082     0.32   0.754    -.4010744    .5404496
    ln_GDPPC  
              
      ln_TAX    -.3636031   1.550102    -0.23   0.818    -3.712395    2.985188
   ln_Credit     .0214921   .0183743     1.17   0.263    -.0182032    .0611873
       ln_BP     .1406704   .0185181     7.60   0.000     .1006645    .1806763
       ln_CA    -.1303263   .1622584    -0.80   0.436    -.4808642    .2202117
    ln_UNEMP    -1.505477   .6981578    -2.16   0.050    -3.013755    .0028015
    ln_CONST     .5772573   .2349851     2.46   0.029     .0696029    1.084912
      ln_POP     .7174751   .9155906     0.78   0.447    -1.260538    2.695488
      ln_CPI     .3105768   .4613965     0.67   0.513    -.6862098    1.307363
      ln_LTR    -.0002123   .0128494    -0.02   0.987    -.0279717     .027547
    ln_GDPPC    -.0740623   .1635829    -0.45   0.658    -.4274616    .2793371
                                                                              
     ln_RPPI        Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                             Robust
                                                                              
                                    (Std. Err. adjusted for 14 clusters in id)
corr(u_i, Xb)  = -0.5244                        Prob > F           =         .
                                                F(13,13)           =         .
       overall = 0.5294                                        max =        18
       between = 0.3166                                        avg =      13.9
R-sq:  within  = 0.7548                         Obs per group: min =        10
Group variable: id                              Number of groups   =        14
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =       195
> I L.ln_POP L.ln_CONST L.ln_UNEMP L.ln_CA L.ln_BP L.ln_Credit L.ln_TAX i.YEAR, fe vce(robust)
. xtreg ln_RPPI ln_GDPPC ln_LTR ln_CPI ln_POP ln_CONST ln_UNEMP ln_CA ln_BP ln_Credit ln_TAX L.ln_GDPPC L.ln_LTR L.ln_CP
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Table 3, 4 and 5 display the Fixed Effects regression outputs. We find that construction costs 
and building permits are an especially strong predictor of property price increases. In the first 
regression, construction costs, building permits (both at a 1% confidence level) and 
unemployment (at a 10% confidence level) were statistically significant. More precisely, the 
results were as follows: An increase in the growth rate of log construction costs of 1%, would 
lead to an increase in log house price growth rates of around 0.92%, respectively, holding all 
other variables constant. This seems reasonable since one of the main price determinants of 
properties is the cost of construction. A 1% increase in the growth rate of log building permits 
would lead to a 0.16% increase in log house price growth rates, respectively. A 1% increase in 
log unemployment rates would lead to a decrease of around 0.38% in log house price growth 
rates. The regression explains 66.39% of the within variation.  
In the regression that only contained lags of the independent variables, construction costs, 
building permits and mortgage rates were statistically significant. This regression explains less 
of the within variation than the previous regression, specifically 59.39%. According to the 
results, a 1% increase in the previous year’s long-term interest rate is associated with a 0.05% 
decrease in log property price growth rates. If mortgage rates are increasing, the number of 
households that can afford housing is decreasing and thus demand and property prices decrease. 
A 1% increase in log construction cost growth rates would lead to an increase in log property 
price growth rates of 0.88% in the following year. Comparing this result with the one from the 
first regression, we can see that the impact of previous year’s construction costs on current 
prices is less strong than the impact of current construction costs. Furthermore, a 1% increase 
in growth rates of log building permits is associated with a 0.08% increase in the growth rate 
of log property prices in the forthcoming year. Even though building permits have a very small 
impact on prices, it can be observed that the building permits of the previous year affect current 
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housing prices a little more. This was expected as it probably takes a while to start building a 
new house and until the additional building permits are reflected in the prices.  
The explanatory variables included in the last regression were able to explain 75.48% of the 
within-variation of housing prices. Thereby, this model explained house price dynamics more 
precisely compared to the previous two regression models. We find evidence that construction 
costs, building permits, unemployment rates as well as the lag of unemployment rates, the lag 
of mortgage rates, and the lag of the taxation on property were statistically significant. A 1 % 
increase in log unemployment rates would lead to a decrease in log housing price growth rates 
of 1.51%, whereas an increase in last year’s unemployment rate by the same amount would 
lead to an increase of 1.30%. This regression output is questionable because we expected last 
year’s unemployment rate to have a negative effect on property prices. A 1% increase in the 
growth rate of log building permits leads to a 0.14% increase in log housing price growth rates. 
A 1% increase in the log long-term interest growth rates would lead to a 0.05% decrease in 
prices in the following year. Taxes on property seem to exercise a quite strong impact on prices: 
a 1% increase in the log tax rate is associated with a 3.37% decrease in log housing price growth 
rates in the following year.  
It is striking that primarily real estate market indicators such as construction costs, building 
permits and mortgage rates influence housing prices. However, we expected mortgage rates to 
have a greater impact. Maybe this small influence could be explained by the fact that 
institutional investors have greater bargaining power and, therefore, influence prices to a greater 
degree than private investors who greatly depend on mortgage rates to finance their 
acquisitions. Furthermore, the importance of funds is steadily increasing and for the fund 
industry, institutional investors such as insurance companies or pension funds are far more 
important than private investors. Currently, real estate funds find themselves in a dilemma: they 
are getting too much money from investors and, at the same time, they can hardly find profitable 
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assets to invest in.27 The development of the fund industry may be one of the reasons why 
lending rates, which are primarily of interest to private investors, have relatively little or no 
impact on real estate prices. Moreover, as these funds possess many equity commitments, we 
believe that they might be willing to pay prices that are not justified by market fundamentals. 
The fact that the majority of the macroeconomic factors are not statistically significant might 
indicate that, compared to a few years or decades ago, when several analysis found evidence of 
the statistical significance of these factors, they may not explain as many of the deviations of 
housing prices anymore. Instead, speculation and expectations of market participants might 
play a bigger role in addition to real estate market factors.  
5 Indicators  
As the first indicator of an overvaluation of housing prices one usually looks at the development 
of the property prices as well as Price-to-Rent (PRR) and Price-to-Income ratios (PIR). 
Residential Property Prices Indices (RPPIs), also known as House Price Indices (HPIs), are 
index numbers that measure the price of residential properties over time. Besides being used by 
citizens and households, these broadly used key statistics also assist to display risk exposure of 
the financial sector and macroeconomic imbalances for economic and monetary policymakers. 
This is due to the fact that, as aforementioned, turmoil on real estate markets can have far-
reaching consequences. For the valuation of properties, discounted cash flow methods are 
mainly used. Accordingly, the discounted future cash flows, rents, define the real estate value.28 
Respectively, rents and property prices are closely linked to one another. Hence, the PPRR is 
one important criterion for the identification of the valuation level and of a speculative price 
bubble on property markets.29 The ratio sets the development of housing prices in relation to 
the development of rental prices and is thus a benchmark that helps to understand whether is it 
                                                
27 Karl, P. (2017) 
28 DiPasquale and Wheaton (1992)  
29 Geltner et al. (2007), p. 14 
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better to buy or to rent a property. In other words, it measures the profitability of owning a 
house. The PRR is a widespread concept which is decisive both for the future disbursed 
payment flows and the market price of a property. Another indicator of overvalued house prices 
is the Price-to-Income Ratio which sets nominal house prices in relation to nominal household 
disposable income per capita. It is used as a measure of affordability.  
Figure 1 shows the evolution of RPPIs in our sample set of countries. It can be observed that 
housing prices in Norway, Sweden, the UK and Canada are currently extremely high (Index Q2 
2017 Norway = 496.75, Index Q1 2017 Sweden = 458.20, Index Q2 2017 UK = 388.59, Index 
Q2 2017 Canada = 369.84). The development of prices in Germany, Portugal, and Switzerland 
was quite flat over the period, even after the bursting of the US subprime bubble. On the 
contrary, the RPPIs in the Nordics grew strongly and steadily since 1995, except Denmark’s 
prices which experienced a drop after 2007.  
Although price indices have moved quite similarly on a first glance, a quite mixed can be 
observed when looking at average returns and volatility of RPPIs picture across countries over 
the sample period (see Table 2). Whereas the average growth rate for countries like Spain, UK 
and Ireland stood at 8.95%, 8.75% and 8.21%, respectively, countries like Portugal, 
Switzerland and Germany only experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.54%, 3.37% 
and 2.29%, respectively. A similar picture can be observed when looking at volatility: the 
indices vary from 7.95% in Ireland to 1.85% in Germany. It is to be expected that countries 
which experienced housing price bubbles – defined by a sharp increase in housing prices 
followed by a sharp bust - such as Ireland, the UK or Spain have high average returns and 
relatively high volatilities.  
As aforementioned, house price increases alone do not indicate an unjustified fundamental 
property value. They have to be examined along with rents and income. Therefore, the price-
to-rent and price-to-income ratios were retrieved from Thomson Reuters DataStream for the 
sample countries. Figure 3 and 4 show the evolution of standardized PRRs and PIRs in our 
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sample countries. Standardized means that the two measures are indexed to a reference value 
equal to 100 over the full sample period. Thus, both ratios are displayed relative to their 
respective long-term averages. In case that PRR and PIR exceed their long-term averages, 
property prices have been increasing faster than rents and income. This is a sign of possible 
pressures in the housing markets. Correspondingly, the imbalance between rents and property 
prices signals overvaluation and the potential presence of a house price bubble.30 The graphics 
(Figure 3 and 4) give a first impression of the common dynamics of real estate prices in these 
countries. It can be observed that, in most countries, the ratios stay well above their reference 
value indicating that prices have grown faster than incomes and rents in a number of countries. 
Often, people interpret sustained periods of high or above reference price-to-rent and/or price-
to-income ratios as an indication of unrealistic expectations of future price increases rather than 
being caused by the fundamental value - and hence believe in a bubble. Not only the RPPIs of 
Canada, Norway and Sweden have been increasing for a long period, but also their PRRs have 
been experiencing a sharp increase since 2009 with a current value of around 170, followed by 
the UK with a value of 138 in 2016. These are also the countries with the highest PIRs in 2016. 
Even if the price-to-income ratios of Portugal, Germany, US and Finland have been growing in 
recent years, they still remain below their long-term average. Portugal’s and Italy’s price-to-
rent ratios are currently below their reference values, Germany’s and Switzerland’s price-to-
rent ratio have been increasing since 2009 and passed the threshold in 2016 and 2013. As result, 
RPPIs, PRRs and PIRs indicate an overvaluation, primarily in the Norwegian, the Swedish, the 
Canadian and in the British property market. Yet, even though price-to-income and price-to-
rent ratios are valuable in providing information on the development of housing prices, they 
suffer from limitations. Only if the expected inflation, the expected nominal long-term interest 
rate and the long-term growth rate of the economy do not change over time, a stable ratio can 
                                                




be expected.31 Because this is difficult to be certain about, these indicators might not always be 
reliable in detecting a bubble and should, therefore, be interpreted carefully. Looking solely at 
house price developments, PRR and PIR will not be sufficient to understand if house prices are 
too high compared to their fundamental values, and to be able to claim that in some of the 
countries a bubble might be forming.  
6 Analyzation method for the detection of housing bubbles: Rolling ADF Test  
For a more comprehensive analysis on whether the 15 OECD economies are experiencing price 
increases that are not justified by fundamentals, a Right Tailed Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(RTADF) test was performed. RTADF unit root tests have become a popular method for 
detecting asset price bubbles. This type of model tests the null hypothesis of a unit root against 
the alternative of a (mildly) explosive process:  
H0: δ = 1 
HA: δ > 1 
Empirically, rejecting the null may provide proof for a property price bubble. The empirical 
analysis of the price level is carried out with the help of the econometrics software EViews. 
Since only the normal left-side unit root tests count as basic features of EViews, an add-in must 
be installed to apply the RTADF tests. There are four variations of the RTADF unit root test: 
the standard ADF test, a rolling window ADF (RDAF) test, the more recent PWY supremum 
ADF (SADF) test and the PSY generalized SADF (GSADF) test. Similar to left-sided unit root 
tests, the analysis results of these tests are significantly influenced by the consideration of a 
constant or deterministic trend in economic time series. Consequently, the determination of the 
underlying model is of crucial importance for the validity of the test procedure. Phillips et al. 
(2013) argue that the inclusion of both a constant drift parameter and a deterministic trend is 
empirically unrealistic.32 The same suggestion was made by Chong and Hurn (2016) which also 
                                                
31 Himmelberg, Mayer, Sinai (2005), p. 17 
32 Pedersen/Schütte (2014), p. 32-33 
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recommend a model without a constant or trend. However, opinions as to which of the four 
RTADF tests to favor differ. For example, while Chong and Hurn’s (2016) results speak for the 
superiority of the RADF method over the SADF and GSADF method, Diba and Grossman 
(1988a) favor the GSADF test. Due to the extremely long computation time of the critical 
GSADF test statistics in EViews, the RADF test was chosen. The normal ADF test is repeatedly 
performed when choosing a Rolling ADF test and each of them is applied to a different sub-
sample size so that an adaptation of the lag length of each subsample is needed. A fixation of 
the number of lags would not be optimal. Against this background, when deciding upon the lag 
length, MSIC was chosen in EViews as lag length selection criteria and the number of lags was 
set to automatic selection, for more consistent lag length estimates.33 Critical t-values are 
determined by a Monte Carlo simulation with 1000 repetitions at a 95% confidence level. The 
initial window size was the one proposed by EViews.34 The advantage of the RADF test is that 
it is able to capture multiple price bubbles due to the estimation of multiple ADF tests for 
different sub-samples. 
6.1 Results RADF Test 
The RADF test results for the quarterly RPPIs of the 15 OECD countries between 1970Q1 and 
2017Q1 provide evidence for price bubbles in some of these real estate markets. Figure 4 shows 
the graphical test results of the RADF tests, where the green line represents the house price 
evolution, the blue line the test statistic and the red line the critical value sequence for a 95% 
significance level. If the blue line lies above the critical value sequence, we view this as an 
indication for overvalued housing prices. In a few countries, especially in Canada, Sweden, 
Norway, Germany, Switzerland, the UK, and the US, the outcomes are thus suggestive of a 
bubble. 
Canada’s house prices are since 1998 above the critical value sequence for a 95% significance 
                                                
33 Pedersen and Schütte (2014), p. 35-36  




level. The test statistic (blue line) dropped sharply after the crisis and increased strongly in 
2015. A similar picture can be observed in Sweden. The country’s prices are since 1998 above 
the critical line and also experienced a huge drop in 2007, before increasing in 2014. Norway’s 
house prices remain above the line for a long time but are always pretty close to it. Moreover, 
Norwegian prices seem to be quite volatile. Even though the outcomes show that Finland’s 
house prices were overvalued since 1998, they are now almost fairly priced. In contrast to many 
other countries in the sample, Germany did not experience a drop in 2007. German prices 
increased since 2006 and are now pretty far above the critical line. Additionally, the price 
movement seemed relatively smooth until 2002 and has become more volatile ever since. After 
the decrease in property prices in 2007, prices in the US and the UK increased around 2013 and 
show overvaluation since 2015. Although Switzerland’s property prices display overvaluation 
since 2003, they have been moving towards ’fair pricing’ since 2012. Portugal’s house prices 
showed no sign of overvaluation until the first quarter of 2017 but it appears like they soon will. 
The other countries such as Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, Denmark and France showed no sign 
of overvaluation as of the beginning of 2017.  
In contrast to Chen and Funke (2013), who applied a GSADF test to examine the German 
housing market between 1987 and 2012 and who could not find evidence of house price 
bubbles, our test results show overvaluation from 1990 until approximately 2000.  
André Anundsen (2016) analyzed imbalances on the US, the Norwegian and the Finnish 
housing market by considering an ADF regression on log price-to-rent ratios including four 
lags and a deterministic trend. The results demonstrate that, in the early 2000s, the US property 
market transformed into a bubble regime until 2006, whereas the other Nordic markets did not 
show any sign of explosive behavior. Our test results, however, indicate that Norway’s housing 
market has been experiencing overvaluation for several years. This might indicate that the 
regression results as to whether or not a country or a city is experiencing a housing bubble may 
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differ depending on the regression model and the options (number of lags, the inclusion of trend 
or constant, etc.) chosen. Further, existing literature differs regarding the time series examined: 
some studies consider house prices whereas others consider price-to-income or price-to-rent 
ratios.  
7 Conclusion 
The objective of this work was to investigate the price dynamics on European and North 
American real estate markets and whether, in this context, a real estate price bubble can be 
empirically demonstrated. There is still no uniform opinion on a scientifically based definition 
of the price bubble phenomenon. Yet, a bubble is often defined as a situation in which the 
market price of an asset rises far above its long-term fundamental value, which is the present 
value of the anticipated rents.  
The development of property prices as well as of Price-to-Rent (PRR) and Price-to-Income 
ratios (PIR) can give a first insight into the valuation level of property prices. The PRR is a 
measure of profitability of owning a house and the PIR is a measure of affordability. In most 
countries the standardized ratios stay well above their reference value, indicating that prices 
have grown faster than incomes and rents. This is often interpreted as an indication of 
unrealistic expectations of future price increases or of a house price bubble. We could observe 
that property prices in the sample countries have been increasing over the recent years, 
especially in Norway, Sweden, Canada, and the UK the Indices are extremely high. This is in 
line with the findings for PRRs and PIRs: Norway, Canada, Sweden and the UK have the 
highest ratios. These extremely high conventional measures that are well above their long-term 
average indicate that these countries are experiencing price increases that are no longer justified 




The main objective of the first part of the empirical section was to identify determinants of 
property prices by applying the Fixed Effects model. This panel methodological framework 
explores the relationship between residential property prices and macroeconomic variables such 
as GDP per capita, current account balance, inflation, unemployment, population growth, 
domestic credit to private sector, mortgage rates, construction costs, building permits and tax 
on property for a sample of 15 OECD economies between 1970 and 2016. According to the 
results, real estate market factors such as construction costs, building permits and mortgage 
rates  and tax on property classified as statistically significant determinants of property prices. 
With the exception of unemployment rates, most macroeconomic factors are not statistically 
significant. This could result from the fact that speculation and expectations of market 
participants might nowadays play a bigger role compared to fundamentals. And this, in turn, is 
associated with a higher risk of a bubble formation.  
Following the analysis of key bubble indicators, a Rolling Augmented Dickey-Fuller test was 
used to examine the house price dynamics in order to find evidence of possible house price 
exaggerations. From the outcomes of the RADF, it follows that house prices were misaligned 
in Canada, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Germany, the UK, and the US in the first quarter of 
2017, signifying possible bubble behavior.  
To sum up, according to the RPPIs, PRRs and PIRs, we find evidence of unjustified house price 
increases in Norway, Sweden, Canada, and the UK. According to the RADF test, Switzerland, 
Germany and the US are showing evidence of house price overvaluation in addition to Norway, 
Sweden, Canada and the UK.  
Even though indicators and the empirical test results display that property prices in some 
countries might no longer be justified by fundamentals, this needs to be interpreted carefully. 
The current macroeconomic situation is very good and the conditions –an inflation rate below 
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the target, very low interest rates, income growth, population growth and a reduction in the 
unemployment rates - speak in favor of rising prices.  
In addition, econometric methods aiming at the justification of property price determinants and 
of house price bubbles face multiple limitations and drawbacks: Unfortunately, high-quality 
real estate data for international comparison is scarcely available. Unlike liquid assets such as 
equities, it is not easy to find a suitable price index for real estate. It is especially difficult to 
price real estate because properties are very heterogeneous. Furthermore, the frequency of 
trading is quite low. House price series are usually constructed from national data sources, so 
that these series may differ in terms of dwelling types and geographical coverage. Moreover, 
Himmelberg (2005) found evidence that price dynamics on property markets are a local 
phenomenon. Hence, certain countries might not indicate a bubble even though some cities 
might, in fact, be overvalued – and it might, therefore, be difficult to make a judgment about a 
country as a whole. Also, changes in fundamentals might have a different effect on countries 
or cities. Price-to-rent and price-to-income ratios should be carefully interpreted since prices 
are more sensitive to interest rate fluctuations and will be higher relative to rents when housing 
supply is rather inelastic.	Besides, it is problematic to discover regularities in the formation of 
bubbles using econometric methods because bubbles are rather rare. Last but not least, a bubble 
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Figure 1: Residential Property Price Indices in advanced European economies 1970q1-2017q1 
 




Figure 3: Annual Price-to-Income Ratio 1990-2016 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics Residential House Price Indices (1970q1-2017q1) 
 
 






Figure 4: RADF Test Results 
 
 






Table 6: Overview Variables 
	
Variable Data	Provider Description Timespan Conversion	Method Adjustment Source Dataset















1961	-	2016,	annually Average Not	SA World	Bank	WDI International	Sources
Long	Term	Bond	Rate Bloomberg	 1985	-	2016,	annually
Unemployment	Rate Thomson	Reuters	Datastream Labour	Markets	Unemployment	Rate,	annual 1950	-	2016,	annually	 Average Not	SA IMF	International	Financial	
Statistics
International	Sources
Population	Growth Thomson	Reuters	Datastream Population	Grwoth	(Annual	%) 1960	-	2016,	annually Average Not	SA World	Bank	WDI International	Sources
Current	Account	Balance	(as	%	of	GDP) Thomson	Reuters	Datastream Current	Account	Balance,	%	of	Gross	Domestic	Product 1960	-	2018	(forecast),	
annually
Average SA OECD	Economic	Outlook,	
copyright	OECD
International	Sources
CPI Thomson	Reuters	Datastream Consumer	Price	Indices,	Percentage	Change	from	
previous	period,	
1961	-	2018	(forecast),	
annually
Average Not	SA OECD	Economic	Outlook,	
copyright	OECD
Tax	on	Property
OECD	data,	
https://data.oecd.org/tax/tax-
on-property.htm
Tax	on	property	is	defined	as	recurrent	and	non-
recurrent	taxes	on	the	use,	ownership	or	transfer	of	
property.	These	include	taxes	on	immovable	property	or	
net	wealth,	taxes	on	the	change	of	ownership	of	
property	through	inheritance	or	gift	and	taxes	on	
financial	and	capital	transactions.	This	indicator	relates	
to	government	as	a	whole	(all	government	levels)	and	is	
measured	in	percentage	both	of	GDP	and	of	total	
taxation.
1965	-	2016,	annually	
Building	Permits
Thomson	Reuters	Datastream Building	Permits	(m2	floor	area):	Residential	Buldings	
(%YOY)	PERMITS(M2	FLOOR	AREA):	RESIDENTIAL	
BLDG.S(%YOY)
1995	-	2016,	annually
Domestic	Credit	to	private	sector	(as	%	of	GDP)
The	World	Bank:	
https://data.worldbank.org/in
dicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS
Domestic	credit	to	private	sector	refers	to	financial	
resources	provided	to	the	private	sector	by	financial	
corporations,	such	as	through	loans,	purchases	of	
nonequity	securities,	and	trade	credits	and	other	
accounts	receivable,	that	establish	a	claim	for	
repayment.	
1960	-	2016,	annually Weighted	average International	Monetary	Fund,	
International	Financial	Statistics	
and	data	files,	and	World	Bank	
and	OECD	GDP	estimates.
Price-to-Rent	Ratio Thomson	Reuters	Datastream 1990	-	2016,	annually	
Price-to-Income	Ratio Thomson	Reuters	Datastream 1990	-	2016,	annually	
